FROM POWER SHARING
to Democracy

POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTIONS IN ETHNICALLY

DIVIDED SOCIETIES   *Edited by Sid Noel*

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Debating Consociational Politics:
Normative and Explanatory Arguments[1]

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Consociational thinking has a long pedigree. Its lineages may be traced to the sixteenth-century Protestant philosopher Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), the early-twentieth-century Austro-Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, and, more recently, the Nobel laureate Sir Arthur Lewis. It is, however, inescapably associated in our times with Arend Lijphart, its contemporary creator and sculptor, the doyen of comparative politics, and a distinguished past president of the American Political Science Association.[2] Over the past thirty years, consociational theory has become one of the most influential theories of comparative politics, resulting in a vast and broadly applied literature.

Consociational thinking, moreover, has not been restricted to the academy. Politicians have refined, innovated, and reinvented consociational institutions and practices in Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, and Macedonia. On occasions, in the guise of "power sharing,"[3] consociation has become the prescribed method of conflict regulation of the "international community" (i.e., the United States when it has the support of the European Union [EU] and the United Nations [UN]). This has been evident in the internationally supported, implemented, and maintained power-sharing agreements in Afghanistan, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Northern Ireland, as well as in prospective power-sharing agreements in Cyprus and Sri Lanka. It may become evident in occupied Iraq. There is, however, no consensus over consociational theory, to

put it mildly. Here, two axes of disagreement are considered: consociationalists and their critics differ, sometimes radically, over the normative merits of consociation; and consociationalists disagree with their critics, and often with each other, over how consociations are established, maintained, or break down. This chapter reviews and evaluates these arguments.[4]

MORAL, NORMATIVE, AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTS OVER CONSOCIATION

Anyone who has followed the debates over consociation will be familiar with how widespread and heated is the abuse that often displaces argument in this field. Proponents of consociation are regularly accused of racism, anti-Enlightenment thought, institutionalizing fallacious ethnicity, promoting apartheid, and even condoning ethnic cleansing. What follows endeavours to provide a dispassionate account of the arguments – and the passions that underlie them.

The Counsels for the Prosecution: Futility, Perversity, Jeopardy, and Denial

Consociational prescription and explanation are attacked by conservatives, liberals, socialists, and feminists. Conservatives detect a hint of utopianism in consociational thinking. They are right to detect "rationalism," meaning the belief that it is at least sometimes possible to engage our reason in benign political engineering. Conservatives tend to condemn consociational ideas as futile: such ideas will have no (or no long-run) impact on deeply rooted, zero-sum identity based conflicts. This, we may say, is the archetypal conservative anti-consociational argument: consociations make no difference. They do not work; therefore, they are not a remedy. A more sophisticated variation of this position holds that consociations are likely to work well only where they are not needed or are redundant (that is, in moderately rather than deeply divided societies). Donald Horowitz maintains that consociations "are more likely the product of resolved struggles or of relatively moderate cleavages," and that they are "inapt to mitigate conflict in severely divided societies."[5]

Critics of consociational ideas are especially prominent in the liberal, socialist, and feminist traditions. They pride themselves on their

universalism and their democratic dispositions. They often argue that consociations are perverse, achieving the opposite of their ostensible purposes. Their standard objection that consociation is perverse follows a proverbial piece of advice: "When holes have been dug, don't entrench them." Consociation, such critics reason, reinforces the presumed sources of conflict. It freezes and institutionally privileges (undesirable) collective identities at the expense of more "emancipated" or more "progressive" identities, such as those focused on class or gender.[6] Consociation, in this perspective, does not resolve conflict: at best, it organizes and regulates a stalemate around the relevant collective identities. It encourages a politics of immobilism and gridlock. Paul Brass is typical of critics who think in this mode: he argues that the elites whose prudence is hailed by consociationalists are the very ones with vested interests in maintaining collective antagonisms. Consociation, he claims, reinforces their respective dominance within their own communities. Brass believes that consociation's proponents operate with the "mistaken assumption that cultural differences among ethnic groups are 'objective' factors." He thinks that consociationalists exaggerate the problems associated with strong collective identities and questions their core premise that "ethnic divisions are more inflammatory than other types."[7]

Liberal, socialist, and feminist critics of consociation unite in suggesting that the political and social opportunities for transforming identities are more extensive than is suggested by what they deem to be the primordial pessimism of consociational thinkers. Interestingly, they see consociationalists as conservatives, who take people as they are (or have been made to be) and not as they might be (and long to be). Ethnicity, according to Rupert Taylor, is seen by consociationalists as a social fact rather than a choice made by people: "The point that consociationalism has not grasped, but that has been central to both liberalism and Marxism, is that human freedom is a power, a Promethean force."[8] Political integration, the creation of a common citizenship and public sphere, and the non-recognition of cultural differences in the public domain, from this perspective, are much preferred over consociation. As Brass puts it, it is best to "keep some possibility for change, internal division [of communities], and secularization open, for the sake of the ultimate integration of the people in a common political order and to preserve individual rights and the future prospects of individual autonomy."[9]

Another standard objection to consociational arrangements, usually made by liberals, socialists, and feminists but also sometimes by conservatives, is that they jeopardize important values, principles, and institutions. Encouraging proportional representation (PR), they say, will lead to the likely irreversible formation of ethnic, communal, or sectarian parties, thereby breaking with the possibilities afforded by a politics of programs and interests and entrenching a more intractable politics based on identities. The use of quotas and proportionality in affirmative action programs or preferential policies will lead to the weakening of the merit principle – thereby creating new injustices as well as inefficiencies in resource allocation.[10] Recognition of difference in the public domain will progressively lead to respect for (unjustified) inequalities, the unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals and groups. Brass speaks for many of these critics when he asserts that "consociational democracy *inevitably* violates the rights of some groups and the rights of some individuals."[11]

The biggest stick with which consociationalists are beaten is the suggestion that they are not democrats. Consociational politics, it is said, is undemocratic; it excludes opposition; it is a loser-takes-all system. "A fully-developed consociational system is inherently undemocratic"; it is elitist and postpones rather than facilitates the "democratization of multi-ethnic societies."[12] It permits "the same combinations of elites to entrench themselves at the peaks of spoils and patronage hierarchies more or less continuously." It emphasizes "participation and representation to the virtual exclusion of opposition." The "democratic benefits that can accrue from 'tossing the rascals out' are unavailable." Consociational systems, it is further charged, "do not give powerful parliamentary players incentives to keep government honest by shining light in dark corners," and "mutual vetoes can be expected to lead to mutual logrolling, rather than to political confrontations among elites, and to promote insider clubism." The price of consociation is "abandoning a viable opposition politics." Consociational systems do not meet Samuel Huntington's definitional test of a democracy: two peaceful turnovers of power following elections.[13] The allegation that it is undemocratic is perhaps the strongest normative objection to consociation. Originally posed by Brian Barry, it is now endlessly recycled.[14]

Observing that Lijphart accepts Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy, one critic maintains that Dahl's emphasis on competitive politics implies that consociational democracy is a contradiction in terms.[15] Arguments

in this vein usually celebrate the merits of oppositional politics. Consociation's opposition to adversarial democratic politics is just wrongheaded, maintains Brass. Adversarial politics, he insists, "have in fact worked to an extent in non-homogeneous societies such as Great Britain ... and in the US."[16] Lijphart's claim that, where there is extensive segmental organization and a history of antagonism, the political choice is between consociational democracy and no democracy at all, Brass regards as empirically unwarranted. Adversarial politics in Canada, India, and Sri Lanka, he maintains, are no worse than the allegedly consociational experiences of Malaysia, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Algeria.[17]

A last argument sometimes deployed against consociations is one of outright denial of their existence. The tactic here is to define consociationalism so rigidly that no society, or almost none, fits the criteria. If atheism is the response to theism, we may call this "aconsociationalism" – the denial that consociations exist or have ever existed. Sometimes this argument rests on the alleged incoherence of consociational ideas. Roughly, the argument is that an incoherent concept explains nothing of what happens in the world.[18] A Marxist variation on the illusory quality of consociation is to suggest that it is a mirage with consequences: it divides and disorganizes the working class around false identities.[19]

The foregoing summation of anti-consociational arguments is not a caricature, nor is it based on a selection of the worst rhetorical excesses. Suspicious readers are counselled to inspect specimens of these arguments over the last thirty years through reading the citations at the end of this chapter. These normative responses to consociation are common to distinguished scholars representing a variety of disciplines and ideological perspectives, including liberal political philosophers such as Brian Barry and Ian Shapiro, liberal political scientists such as Ian S. Lustick[20] and Paul Brass, and conservative political scientists such as Donald L. Horowitz. It is of interest that it is possible to classify three of the standard political and ethical arguments against consociation according to the tropes of Albert Hirschman's *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy.*[21] As Hirschman observes in his delightful book, in any particular case of proposals for new institutions, the three rhetorical reactionary objections cannot be simultaneously true, even if they highlight different possible difficulties. Likewise, while one may freely concede that critics of consociation have frequently pointed to difficulties in Lijphart's formulations and expositions (to which he has made appropriately measured and reasoned responses),[22]

it is also plainly the case that consociation cannot simultaneously be perverse – i.e., reinforce and re-entrench ethnic antagonisms and jeopardize key liberal, democratic, and international values – *and* futile, i.e., make no difference.

The futility thesis, which is plainly the weakest of the three rhetorical tropes, can hardly account for the many passionate criticisms of consociational theory that have been mounted over the last three decades. It is fair to say that the weight of the critics' normative briefs and their most compelling rhetoric rest on the perversity and jeopardy arguments, i.e., the claims that consociation reinforces what it is supposed to remedy and endangers democracy, liberty, individual rights (including women's rights), and more desirable forms of party organization and competition based on class, interest, or ideology.

The Consociational Rebuttal:
Realism, Necessity, and Accommodation

How do consociationalists understand themselves? As realists; as counsellors of necessary triage; and as democrats fully aware that consociations need not (and should not) be applied in every country or every possible policy sector where identity politics may manifest itself. They are just as concerned about justice as their critics. And, they submit, consociational settlements are "naturally" recurrent phenomena – generated through negotiations by politicians and not necessarily engineered into existence by political scientists.

Consociationalists present themselves as realists, but not in some caricatured Hobbesian or Machiavellian stereotype. They believe that certain collective identities, especially those based on nationality, ethnicity, language, and religion, are generally fairly durable once formed. To say that they are durable, or are likely to be durable, however, is not to say that they are either primordial or immutable. Nor is it to imply that they necessarily generate intense throat-cutting antagonisms, nor that they are generally desirable. But consociationalists insist that durable identities – as opposed to shallow, malleable, and short-run identifications – can be, and often are, mobilized in a politics of antagonism, perhaps especially during the democratization of political systems. Politicians, parties, and communities interpret their histories and futures through powerful narratives, myths, and symbols, as well as

through realistic rather than merely prejudiced appraisals of past group antagonisms. These narratives, myths, and symbols may have significant resonance and truth content. Without those traits, politicians might be less successful in their manipulative endeavours.[25]

Consociationalists' self-styled realism is evident in how they demur and bristle at the suggestion that they are utopian. In their view, it is the "social constructionists" (those who believe that identities are constructed for specific purposes) and certain liberals and socialists who are too facile and too optimistic about the capacities of political regimes to dissolve, transform, or transcend inherited collective identities who are utopian. Consociationalists observe that many liberals and socialists eventually work within and embrace consociational arrangements – but only after they have imbibed a strong dose of realism.

Academic consociationalists have a sharp eye for the biases of the analyst: having studied national, ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts, they are aware of the dangers of imposing their own wishful readings on the attitudes and behaviours of others. They question the cosmopolitan or emancipatory protestations of many anti-consociationalists. These protestations, they think, too often cloak a partisan endorsement of one community's identity and interests (into which others are to be encouraged to integrate or assimilate, supposedly in their own best interests). The protestations may, however, be made in good faith; in which case, consociationalists think that they show a distressing lack of self-consciousness on the part of the relevant persons about their own cultural baggage and how it might be read by others.

Consociationalists argue from a standpoint of moral and political necessity: they do not embrace pluralism for its own sake, or because they want a romantic celebration of a thousand different flowers (or weeds). They maintain that a hard confrontation with reality forces certain options on decision makers in deeply divided territories. In some tough cases, their claim is that the only real choice is between consociational arrangements and worse alternatives. These worse alternatives may take the form of sustained armed conflict, genocide, ethnic expulsion, imposed partition, or imposed control (i.e., the coercive control by one community or coalition of communities of another). The consociationalists' claim is that dispassionate analysis sometimes shows that the choice is between consociational democracy and no (worthwhile) democracy at all. Their view is that it is best not to have to build

democracy after filling graveyards. A negotiated consociational settlement, they insist, is better than a winner-takes-all outcome – especially where taking all implies killing, expelling, or assimilating the losers.

Consociationalists reply to liberals and socialists not by repudiating their politics, since they themselves are usually either liberals or socialists, but by arguing that democratic versions of liberalism and socialism may sometimes be feasible only within consociational structures (either temporary or of more durable construction). They invoke necessity and realism to challenge the confidence of liberals in majoritarian and adversarial democracy. J.S. Mill famously warned of the dangers of a tyranny of the majority, but in his most illustrious texts he interestingly failed to emphasize that a national or ethnic tyranny is feasible within democratic institutions.[24]

Consociationalists are mostly liberals, but they are cautiously sceptical about the current celebration of civil society as *the* (or even *a*) vehicle of transformation, peace making, and peace building. In divided territories there is more than one society and their relations may be far from civil. Consociationalists caution that a well-designed state or system of governance is necessary to enable effective civil societies to flourish. They think that those who embrace a politics of deliberative democracy as the prescription for conflict need reminding that deliberation takes place in languages, dialects, accents, and ethnically toned voices and that it is not possible to create "ideal speech situations."

Consociationalists respond to socialists in two ways: one, by showing that consociational ideas have been present in the best of the socialist and the Marxist tradition;[25] and two, by observing just how regularly and pervasively working-class and popular unity has historically been rendered hopeless by national, ethnic, religious, and communal divisions that might have been amenable to at least temporary consociational treatment. Within consociational arrangements, had they been tried, trust might have developed that would have fostered wider working-class or popular unity – for example, behind the welfare state or other forms of progressive distributive politics.

Consociationalists are friends of democracy as well as critics of its palpably inappropriate versions. Consociationalists want majorities – rather than *the* majority or *the* plurality – to control or influence government. Lijphart modestly credited the contemporary invention (though not the naming) of consociational democracy to Sir Arthur Lewis.[26] In his *Politics of West Africa* (1965), Lewis argued that the

post-colonial, multi-ethnic states of West Africa suffered from the inheritance of British and French majoritarian or winner-takes-all democratic systems. He reasoned that what they required were wide and inclusive coalition governments, electoral systems based on PR, and federations that would give ethnic communities territorial autonomy. Lewis's argument is all the more remarkable and prescient in that it was made by deduction, since he did not have an extensive empirical comparative politics of democratic types to draw upon.[27]

Majoritarian democracy – especially when it is based on a single-party government rooted in one community – is, consociationalists say, likely to provoke serious communal conflict in territories with two or more significantly sized communities with durable identities differentiated by nationality, ethnicity, language, and religion. Elite bargaining and adjustment in such territories should be designed to achieve widespread consensus – to prevent the possibility that democracy will degenerate into a war of communities. Realists should therefore, in their view, endorse a politics of accommodation, of leaving each group to their own affairs where that is possible and widely sought – "good fences make good neighbours."[28]

Consociationalists argue positively for consociation, rather than just by pointing to the horrors of the alternatives. Consociation, they maintain, provides autonomy for communities and facilitates sensible intercommunity cooperation. Michael Walzer, thinking of regions once under the Ottoman Empire, suggests that consociation is a heroic and imaginative political enterprise: "Consociationalism is a heroic program because it aims to maintain imperial coexistence without the imperial bureaucrats and without the distance that made those bureaucrats more or less impartial rulers … the different groups have to tolerate one another and work out among themselves the terms of their coexistence."[29]

Consociationalists generally claim that they have a better and more inclusive model of democracy than majoritarians. In a consociation, many more of the people than a plurality or a majority may influence or control the executive. Many more than a majority get effective "voice." Consociation does not eliminate democratic opposition within communities, but it does enable such divisions and oppositions as exist to flourish in conditions of generalized security. Nothing precludes intra-bloc democratic competition, or the turnover of political elites, or shifts of support between parties; and, in a liberal consociation, nothing necessarily blocks the dissolution of historic identities if that

is what people want. Consociationalists do not say that achieving accountability over political leaders and parties is not a problem in consociational democracy: they merely claim that there is no insuperable problem. Consociationalists also point out that it is a fallacy to suppose that consociation mandates that all governments be wholly encompassing grand coalitions. Since this fallacy is so widespread, it is important that it be carefully rebutted.

Complete, Concurrent, and Weak Consociations

The stipulation that Lijphart has sometimes made that consociation requires a grand coalition of all the political leaders of all significant ethnic segments in a region or state creates difficulties. As we have seen, it has led many to question whether democratic consociations have ever existed, or, alternatively, to maintain that the concept of consociation is disordered: "Grand coalition [is] a catch-all concept, describing any joint governmental or quasi-governmental activity pursued by segmental elites whether they undertake that activity as bloc representatives or not, or engage at all in 'summit diplomacy.'"[30] These difficulties may be addressed by distinguishing between complete, concurrent, and weak democratic consociational executives (which, in either parliamentary or separation of powers systems, creates a range of variation in oppositional possibilities).[31]

In a *complete* consociational executive, the leaders of all significant segments of an ethnically differentiated territory are represented. Imagine, for example, that there are two ethnic groups, N_A and N_B, and that all voters in both groups split their votes between two political parties respectively, giving rise to a four-party political system: A_1, A_2, supported by segment N_A, and B_1, B_2, supported by segment N_B. In a complete consociation, these four parties would all be represented in the executive. This hypothetical scenario unambiguously corresponds to Lijphart's idea of "grand coalition." But Lijphart and others also want to count as consociational those executives in which not all political leaders of all significant segments are included. This is entirely reasonable, since it is the word "grand" – implying "total" and "all-encompassing" – that causes difficulties. What matters is meaningful, cross-community, joint decision making within the executive. And that may take place not only in complete consociational executives but in the following types as well.

In a *concurrent* consociational executive, each significant ethnic segment has representation in the executive and that executive has at least majority support in each significant segment. Unlike a complete consociational executive, a concurrent consociational executive is one in which each significant segment has over half of its voters supporting parties in the government. Thus, using the above example, a concurrent executive would comprise parties A_1 and B_1, and both of these parties would have majority support within their respective segments, N_A and N_B.

In a *weak* consociational executive, each significant segment has competitively elected political leaders in the executive, but, in at least one segment, the relevant leadership has only plurality (rather than majority) support among voters. In other words, an executive is weakly consociational if one or more segment merely gives its plurality assent while other segments give majority or higher levels of support to the government. Thus, a weak executive would comprise parties A_1 and B_1, each of which is the largest party in its segment (though at least one is not a majority party), and each of which is opposed by a range of smaller parties.

The above classification is intended to help resolve a recurrent and widespread misunderstanding. It bears repeating that a democratic consociation does not require a complete, total, or all-encompassing grand coalition in the executive. What it must have is meaningful cross-community executive power sharing in which each significant segment is represented in the government with at least plurality levels of support within its segment.[32] This clarification is crucial rather than pedantic because it effectively rebuts the insistence by some that all consociational practices are inherently undemocratic because they preclude opposition.[33] This distinction between complete, concurrent, and weak consociational executives need not be applied just to executives. It may be applied equally fruitfully to legislative procedures and especially to constitutional-amendment procedures – not least because these will normally have a bearing upon the capacities of executives.

Having established that consociational executives need not be all-inclusive grand coalitions, we will now turn more briefly to other controversies concerning the democratic character of consociational executives. Consociations may exist which do not include all segments in government. This situation arises trivially in any large and complex state or region in which there are numerous small ethnic minorities and

categories of persons (especially as a result of recent immigration) that are not sufficiently significant – demographically, electorally, or politically – to be organized into any consociational settlement. Thus, the non-representation in political arrangements of Polish immigrants to Lebanon, or of Indian immigrants to Northern Ireland, does not disprove the existence of a consociation. Moreover, consociational practices may also prevail without the participation of one or more ethnic segment that *is* demographically, electorally, or politically significant. Such consociations are of two types.

In the first type, a dominant coalition deliberately excludes another segment. This can be seen as a combination of consociation and control – consociation for the dominant group who in turn exercise control over the dominated. The logical extension of Lijphart's discussions[34] would be to regard Israel as an illustration of this scenario: concurrent executive consociation among Israeli Jews, under Labour or Likud coalitions, and control by the Israeli government over Palestinians in Israel and in the areas nominally governed by the Palestinian Authority.

In the second type, a whole segment, or a significant majority of a segment, deliberately refuses to participate in consociational arrangements, even though they have been offered places. This is voluntary self-exclusion. A majority of Northern Irish nationalists between 1976 and 1998, for example, refused to accept any solely internal cross-community executive power-sharing arrangement. They demanded, among other things, an Irish dimension: significant inter-governmental and cross-border institutions involving the government of Ireland.[35]

Another way in which a segment, or a party from a segment, may be excluded from representation in an executive is through threshold effects. Every electoral system automatically has some logical or formal threshold that candidates or parties have to achieve in order to win representation.[36] Likewise, consociational executives may have formal rules that produce thresholds of electoral support and legislative representation that parties must achieve before winning control over executive portfolios. In South Africa's transitional consociational arrangements – which were agreed upon in negotiations between the National Party and the African National Congress (ANC) in 1992–93 – political parties had to obtain 5 per cent of the vote before they could be guaranteed places in the cabinet, and 20 per cent of the vote if they wanted to be guaranteed one of the two executive vice-presidential posts. In Northern Ireland, after its 1998 settlement, ten cabinet

positions were available to political parties in proportion to their voting shares. Allocation took place according to a specific algorithm, the d'Hondt formula, which effectively excludes parties that fail to achieve significant levels of electoral and legislative support. Four parties, with 22, 21, 20, and 18 per cent of the first-preference vote respectively, took all of the ten cabinet positions, leaving a fifth of the electorate without a cabinet member representing their first-preference vote.[37] These South African and Northern Irish examples illustrate how proportional-allocation rules and threshold effects may lead to the democratic exclusion of smaller segments, or some parties of smaller segments, from access to the executive.

Another issue here is the question of exclusion and inclusion of segments over time.[38] If a pivotal or dominant party alternates in its choice of segmental parties in sharing executive power (as occurred in the Netherlands before the 1970s), how may such a case be classified? One simple answer is that the executive is consociational with respect to the included segments (and variable in degree: i.e., the executive may enjoy complete, concurrent, or weak support from within the included segments). But it is not consociational with respect to the excluded segment(s).[39]

Inter-ethnic, Non-ethnic, and Consociational Parties

It is necessary to insist further on the potentially democratic calibre of consociational arrangements, both with respect to representation and inclusiveness and with respect to oppositional politics. It is rare, even in an extremely ethnically, religiously, or culturally divided territory, for nearly all voters to vote cleanly for ethnic parties or candidates representing "their" segments. Some members of some minorities may vote for non-ethnic parties or candidates of other segments as proof of their integrationist or assimilationist intent. Where a political system deliberately obliges voters to vote only within their own segment for their own ethnic parties, then the system should be called *corporately* consociational. Separate electoral rolls for each ethnic community, with a requirement that everyone register on one and only one roll, illustrates this phenomenon – the British Raj's organization of separate electoral rolls before Indian independence is a well-known example of such a device. Another example is Cyprus (under the 1960 constitution), where citizens had to opt to be on Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot

rolls. By contrast, in a *liberal* consociation, all voters are on a common electoral register, and, though they may vote for their own ethnic parties, they are not required to do so. The distinction between corporate and liberal consociational practice corresponds to Lijphart's distinction between "pre-determined" and "self-determined" group identity.

In liberal consociational democracies, as in other democracies, there will, of course, be voters who vote for non-ethnic, inter-ethnic, and cross-ethnic parties. Where they are a minority in each significant segment, and a minority overall, they may oppose – but cannot successfully challenge – a consociational regime. In some cases, such voters create a new segment, a segment of "others" who reject the available ethnic and party identifications. This new segment may oppose consociational arrangements and support a new, transcendent, hybrid, or non-ethnic identity, or, alternatively, they may start to bargain for a proportionate stake in the system. In other cases, voters who back non-ethnic, inter-ethnic, and cross-ethnic parties are signalling integrationist or assimilationist dispositions. If such voters become majorities in each segment, it is likely that consociational arrangements will dissolve.

The informal "descriptive" representation of segments within otherwise formally non-ethnic parties may lead to the creation of weakly consociational executives, for example, when a large catch-all governing party enjoys plurality support from each segment. Large catch-all (or ideological or even confessional) parties that deliberately ensure that they have proportional quotas of candidates for parliamentary or ministerial office from all significant ethnic groups have clear intentions. They are trying both to appeal to voters as ethnic voters, by using consociational devices within their own organizations (for example, proportionality), and to ensure the party against possible withdrawals of support on ethnic criteria. Where such parties are successful and go on to form single-party governments, they are unlikely to resemble complete or concurrent consociational executives, but they may well enjoy plurality support within each significant segment. The Canadian Liberal Party may be seen as a descriptively consociational governing party because it alternates its party leadership between French and English speakers, allots informal quotas of cabinet seats to anglophones and francophones, and generally enjoys plurality support among both anglophones and francophones.[40] Similar interpretations have been advanced about the Indian National Congress in its heyday and are beginning to be suggested about the ANC in South Africa.[41] In summary,

governing parties may be classified as consociational by four criteria: (1) the extent to which they draw support from each major segment of voters at plurality levels or above; (2) the extent to which they are descriptively representative in the legislature and the cabinet of the state or region that they govern; (3) their internal party organizational characteristics (i.e., the extent to which their internal governance follows consociational traits of executive power sharing, autonomy, proportionality, and veto rights); and (4) the extent to which they follow consociational practices to manage crises that have national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious roots.[42]

A Last Word on the Democratic Calibre of Consociational Arrangements

Elsewhere I have shown that presidencies, especially collective presidencies, have ranked at least as prominently as variants of parliamentary premier-cabinet executives in "actual functioning consociational systems."[43] That suggests an interesting riposte to critics of consociation: separation-of-power systems create formal mechanisms for accountability and checks and balances of a different nature to those in parliamentary systems, and the critics have an overly strong and unexamined bias in favour of parliamentary systems (though in this respect they share much in common with Lijphart). There is no reason why separation of powers systems with collective presidencies need preclude either opposition or accountability. But what matters from the perspective of consociational theory is not whether a democratic regime is parliamentary or presidential but whether it has cross-community power sharing over executive functions and legislative agenda setting (and to what degree: complete, concurrent, or weak). To the degree that it is complete, opposition will indeed be weak; to the degree that it is either concurrent or weak, opposition will be more vigorously evident.

This analysis has qualified certain of Lijphart's views. First, rather than requiring a grand coalition government, a democratic consociation necessarily has an executive in which there is significant cross-segmental representation, though the forms of representation may range from complete to concurrent to weak. Consociations vary, in short, in the extent to which segments are included and in the degree of opposition to the governing coalition in the executive. Second, the degree to which they are liberal or corporate in their popular and assembly voting

systems should distinguish democratic consociations. Third, consociational arrangements may co-exist with non-ethnic and inter-ethnic parties. Fourth, consociational executives are as likely to be presidential as parliamentary, and consociational advocates need have no necessary bias against collective as opposed to single-person presidencies.

Consociational arrangements, it bears saying again, need not be comprehensive: they may be confined to distinct constitutional and policy sectors (in the domain of the politics of identity, recognition, and constitutional change); or they may be applied piecemeal where they are deemed necessary. They need not be mechanically applied throughout the entirety of politics. Nor are consociationalists peddlers of a panacea: the practices they commend are not everywhere likely to be either feasible or desirable.

Consociational arrangements allow for and facilitate greater justice, both procedural and social, say its advocates. Groups govern themselves in agreed domains of autonomy. Distributions that follow proportional allocations may be seen as fair: to each according to their numbers. Within a democratizing world, this idea of fairness has an underlying moral appeal. There is also a correlation between numbers and potential power that makes such a mode of justice likely to be stable and legitimate.

Consociationalists argue that they are realistic, democratic, and interested in just and stable accommodations of differences between communities. They observe, however, that consociations may and do occur without their urgings. Politicians who are without explicit schooling in consociational theory continually invent (and reinvent) consociational rules and institutions. These inventions are "natural" creative political responses to a politics of antagonism: the outcomes of negotiated deals. Politicians, Lijphart observes, invented consociational rules and institutions in the Netherlands in 1917, in Lebanon in 1943, in Malaysia in 1958, and in Northern Ireland in 1972.[44] Consociations were reinvented by American diplomats to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995; by Lebanese and Northern Irish politicians with external prompting in 1989 and 1998 respectively; and by EU diplomats in promoting the Ohrid Agreement between Macedonian Slavs and Macedonian Albanians. The UN and the EU between them have been trying to mediate a consociational and federal settlement in Cyprus, and the United States may end up overseeing something similar in Iraq. Nor is it just politicians who reinvent consociational ideas. Jurists,

constitutional designers, and political theorists constantly do so. As do so-called ordinary people. Jurists in the Holy Roman Empire proposed consociational ideas; and consociational propositions were freshly minted by the Austro-Marxists, especially by Karl Renner. Within academic political theory, without a full appreciation of the history of their ideas, many contemporary multiculturalists advance consociational agendas: inclusivity (cross-community power sharing), quotas (proportionality), and group rights (autonomy) are usually advanced as a package for remedying the participatory defects of contemporary democracies.[45]

To sum up the rebuttal: in response to the charge of futility, consociationalists respond with some modest but important success stories; to the accusation of perversity, they reply, first, that it is often more perverse to deny the existence and salience of ethnic identities (and provoke conflict thereby) than it is to build upon them, and second, that the dissolution of (undesirable) collective identities and antagonisms may be more likely to occur *after* a period of consociational governance. Lastly, to the charge of jeopardy, they emphatically plead "not guilty."

EXPLANATORY THEORIES OF CONSOCIATION

The ethical and political controversy surrounding consociations and normative consociational theory should be evident. Debates are no less heated over the explanations of why consociations are established, maintained, and break down. The academic literature on this matter is surprisingly *ad hominem* and disputatious, perhaps because the normative, ethical, and political issues just discussed underpin it. The authors are not impartial in these matters. What is presented here is an attempt at a constructive synthesis with Lijphart's work: it seeks to build on Lijphart's achievements while avoiding *ad hominem* counter-attacks on his critics.

Our focus is on genesis. It is on why consociations are formed, although what allows a consociation to be formed will often help to maintain it. There are two general means by which we might seek to explain the formation of consociations: the inductive and the deductive. The inductive approach seeks to identify all past and present consociations and the antecedent conditions they had in common before they were created, especially those conditions that differentiated these cases from cases where consociations were not formed. Whatever all

these regime creations had in common might reasonably be presumed to facilitate (or, more weakly, not obstruct) consociations. The inductive approach thus seeks to identify different configurations or pathways that lead to the creation of consociations. The deductive approach, by contrast, seeks to identify the necessary conditions for consociations to be created through logical inspection of the definitional and operational indicators of consociation, and then to test for their existence (or non-existence) in explaining the formation or otherwise of consociations. In its most ambitious version, the deductive approach attempts to identify the necessary and sufficient causes of consociations.

As is often the case when philosophical contrasts are highlighted, evidence of both approaches may be found in the literature explaining consociations, sometimes within the work of the same author. No necessary confusion need result from this fact of life. Lijphart himself has been mostly inductivist while Adriano Pappalardo and Eric Nordlinger have been formal exponents of a deductive approach.[46] The following critical survey does not attempt to trace the historical order in which the factors conducive to consociationalism were identified and debated.[47] Instead, it focuses analytically on (a) the divisions between groups (the demography and historical sociology of group relations); (b) the domestic political regime (and the relations of its elites and citizens); and (c) the external relations of the state or region.

(a) Divisions between Groups

Numbers surely matter in all aspects of inter-ethnic relations. But how do they matter in promoting consociations (or in disposing them to breakdown)? That requires a consideration of the numbers of groups and their inter-relationships, and their respective numerical shares of the state or region's population.

Is there a dominant segment? Lijphart himself identifies the absence of a majority segment in a given state or region as one of the two most important conditions facilitating the formation of a consociational democracy.[48] Earlier he saw "a multiple balance of power" as being more conducive to consociational democracy than either a "dual balance of power" or hegemony by a majority segment.[49] The latter intuition, regarding the presence or absence of a majority segment, seems sound. A hegemonic segment, with a demographic and electoral

majority, has no obvious democratic incentive to be disposed towards consociational arrangements with segmental minorities.

Even so, Lijphart's thesis needs partial qualification. A dominant descriptively consociational party may exist in such an environment, rooted in the demographically and electorally hegemonic segment. Some suggest that this is true of the ANC in contemporary South Africa and was true of the Congress Party in India. Such a party need not be strongly disposed towards the full array of consociational institutions and practices, but the relevant minorities may have some credible bargaining power that induces consociational behaviour in the otherwise dominant party. A minority comprised of the co-religionists, co-ethnics, co-linguals, or co-nationals of a neighbouring and significant power may have such credible bargaining power (the Muslims of India were partly conceived of in this way in the early history of independent India). An economically vital minority, with high levels of human capital and the means to emigrate (the whites of South Africa may be an example), may be another candidate for consociational generosity by the leaders of the majority segment. In short, such minorities' resources, and their bargaining (or blackmail) potential, may constrain the hegemonic potential of a demographic and electoral majority segment.

A majority segment might also be inclined to appease with consociational practices a minority that is expanding demographically and thus on the verge of altering the segmental balance of power in the electoral arena. This will be especially so if the expanding minority cannot be easily assimilated, integrated, controlled, or expelled. The steady demographic expansion of cultural Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the concomitant rise in support for Irish nationalists, was a background variable in encouraging some members of the diminished cultural Protestant and Unionist segment to consider a new concurrent and comprehensive regional consociational experiment in 1998. The rapid demographic growth of the Albanian population in Macedonia, and recent international constraints on ethnic expulsion in the region, likewise persuaded some Slavic Macedonians to support the consociational Ohrid Agreement in 2000. The argument for consociation within the respective majority segments in Northern Ireland and Macedonia takes the form of saying, "It is better to make a generous deal now than face having a full reversal of status dictated to us in the future." For this to be plausible, the dominant group's political class needs to be

persuaded that the growing minority, if treated well, will not behave as an oppressor when it becomes a majority.

Lastly, demographically, electorally, and fully hegemonic majority segments may adopt some consociational practices as acts of generosity. They may do so in response to the demands of indigenous peoples. The latter may appeal to the consciences of the descendants of the settlers who overran (and sometimes exterminated) the prior holders of the land. Such minorities may be treated generously in compensation for historic maltreatment, and because they lack any credible demographic or electoral capacity to overturn their historic conquest. Likewise, dominant majorities may tolerate consociational claims from isolated, small, and religiously or linguistically intense minorities that pose no threat to their dominance.

The pathways just considered are logically reversible, in the manner of good explanations. That is to say, where demographically and electorally hegemonic majorities have no strategic reasons to accommodate potentially subversive or credibly threatening minorities, they are likely to be anti-consociational. Or, analogously, if minorities lose their bargaining power through the loss of population or economic power, or through the weakening of their external supporters in neighbouring regimes or great powers, then the dominant segment will be correspondingly more disposed against consociation. Likewise, if the dominant experience no guilt, or are intolerant of religious and linguistic minorities, they will be deaf to consociational recipes for accommodating unthreatening communities. In addition, we may safely predict that, within hegemonic groups, there will be those who warn that making a consociational settlement with an ascendant minority will be the prelude to a full reversal in power relations. They will be correspondingly tempted by the options of control, expulsion, or territorial downsizing.

These considerations indicate that even the most plausible condition favouring the formation of a democratic consociation is not an invariable law: a demographically and electorally dominant segment may produce parties and politicians who may embrace some consociational practices and settlements. But the intuition that the demographic and electoral balance of power is critical in assessing the likelihood of consociational settlements is nevertheless politically and sociologically plausible. Secure and sovereign hegemonic groups are likely to be ill-disposed towards consociation. There are, however, many possible balances of power other than one in which there is a hegemonic group.

Two others are worth distinguishing: a dual balance of power, and a balance between what Lijphart terms "multiple equal but few segments."

Lijphart regards a dual balance of power as unlikely to promote consociation because each segment's leaders may hope to win a decisive majority and thus have insufficient incentives to create a stable consociation.[50] The intuition seems sound but requires careful qualification.

If demographic transformations convert the relations between groups from a situation of dominance towards one of dualism, then, other things being equal, the segment that is losing dominance has incentives to consider consociation. On the other side, the ascendant segment may have a clear present interest in preferring a share in power to the uncertainty of winning majority status in the future. The dynamics of demographic and electoral transformation are plainly critical to the respective calculations. We may hypothesize that a fast reversal in demographic shares is less likely to promote and stabilize a consociational settlement. A slow equalization of demographic shares, by contrast, may be more likely to generate a consociational equilibrium. Indeed, such a situation may lead to a "Nash equilibrium" in which each segment's best response to other segments' best response is to endorse a consociational settlement.[51]

There have been consociational settlements made in conditions approaching segmental dualism, such as in post-war Austria between Catholics ("Blacks") and Socialists ("Reds"), in Northern Ireland in 1998 between Irish nationalists and British unionists, and in 2000 in Macedonia between Slavs and Macedonians – though in all cases there was not pure dualism, and in the latter two cases each of the major segments had internal party divisions. What may have been decisive in each case was the respective calculation by sufficient leaders and parties in each segment that they could not decisively and immediately shift the balance of power in their favour to obtain or retain or recover hegemony. As Adriano Pappalardo puts it, "consociational democracy is not so much a pact among minorities in equilibrium or minorities *tout court*, as a pact among minorities who do not want and are not in a position to change the existing distribution of power."[52] These considerations suggest that the equalization of the demographic, electoral, and bargaining resources of the segments may help create and maintain consociations. They also suggest, however, that once equalization is achieved, or approached, it is critical that the balance of power remain; otherwise, the appreciations that produced a settlement

will be undermined. The segmental leaders and their followers need to believe that holding their own share of power and autonomy is more prudent than moving towards dominance.

The existence of "multiple equal but few segments" may produce a different balance of power. This odd-sounding configuration of numbers of segments and their relations is one Lijphart has suggested as being the most conducive towards consociational settlements and their maintenance. To some extent, this argument has been confused with others about the merits of multi-party as opposed to two-party dynamics. It is a matter of logical deduction from the definition of consociational democracy that a multi-party environment is more likely when PR systems operate, which in turn makes the formation of coalition governments more likely. But no one should assume a one-to-one mapping between segments and parties, especially when there is PR.

Several considerations should make us question Lijphart's assumption that multiple, few, and equally sized segments are necessarily the optimal environment for generating consociations. One is practical. If there are multiple segments, there may also be multiple parties within each segment – a situation that may complicate the making of stable consociational pacts that enjoy pluralitarian or concurrent majority support across all segments. The number of potential negotiating partners, after all, multiplies as the number of equally significant parties expands. Another is political. Where there are three to five major segments, a dominant coalition may be possible, depending on the size of the respective groups. Two or more segments may coalesce – possibly as consociational partners – and then seek to dominate others. Bosnia-Herzegovina tragically illustrates this point. There, the presence of three substantial ethnic segments produced not an accommodating grand coalition but instead an unstable dominant coalition that sought to exercise control over the excluded segment.[53]

History matters, or does it? There is a simple path-dependency argument associated with Hans Daalder; namely, prior elite traditions of accommodation and "pillarization" – prior, that is, to democratization – make the forging and maintenance of a consociational settlement easier. He had the Netherlands and Switzerland in mind.[54] In one respect, this thesis seems trivially true: a history of inter-segmental accommodation makes its continuation more likely. However, it has a logical explanatory corollary. A prior history of elite antagonism – again, prior to democratization – must make a consociational settlement

less likely. That, of course, means that recommending consociation where it is needed is likely to be akin to sowing seed in infertile soil, which is an anti-consociationalist argument. Lijphart, Gerhard Lehmbruch,[55] and Eric Nordlinger[56] all independently invoke the idea that elites may learn from history. Elites, they conclude, may engage in a self-denying prophecy and make a peaceful accommodation to avoid the costs of actual or possible protracted civil war, as did the Swiss in the nineteenth and the Lebanese in the twentieth century, and as the communities of Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Macedonia may be doing now. That, too, seems obviously true, in which case, strikingly different histories have the same potential: histories of accommodation and histories of antagonism may both promote consociational settlements.

One can write the case histories of successful and failed consociations in two ways: showing how they had benign accommodative pasts, or showing how malign pasts contributed positively to the present. Non-colonial relationships between the segments are more likely to dispose communities towards accommodation.[57] By contrast, contestation over the identity of the authentic natives, over who are the homeland people, is likely to make consociational settlements more problematic,[58] as will a recent history of attempted genocide or of expulsion. That history can be used both as portent and as salutary prophecy is not, of course, unique to the politics of consociation. Neither facile determinism nor facile voluntarism makes social-scientific sense. We may conclude that elites who want to make a consociational settlement, or who want to maintain one, may draw upon traditions of accommodation – if they exist; or they may argue for accommodation to counteract a negative history and an appalling future – if that is what is required. That in turn implies that the conjunction of current motivations and beliefs of elites and their publics, current resources and sociology of group relations, and current institutional and external environments may be more important than received histories in accounting for consociational settlements. Persons, of course, make history, but not just as they please.

The nature of the cleavages in divided societies, and the relationship between cleavages, are clearly important factors. Lijphart writes as if all possible cleavages that give rise to enduring segmental antagonisms are equally amenable to consociational treatment. That does not seem to be so. Consociation alone may not be enough to overcome some types of divisions. There are good grounds for supposing that, where communities are already mobilized as nations or parts of nations, they

will not be content with consociational settlements that simply leave the existing definitions of state sovereignty intact. Such groups may be outright secessionists and refuse power sharing, or regard it as co-option. Hence, they may be willing to accept consociational arrangements only if other arrangements dilute the sovereignty or unitary nature of the existing state. For example, they may require recognition of their national identity in new political institutions and co-sovereign or confederal relationships.[59] Consociational arrangements *alone* are not enough to pacify a nationalist community with authentic and feasible irredentist or secessionist ambitions, as in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, or Cyprus, but they may, nonetheless, constitute a fundamental *part* of a stable settlement. It follows that a shared national identity among potentially rival communities, however weak, facilitates *simple* consociational arrangements, i.e., ones that do not address the territorial definition or sovereignty of the state.

But what of other cleavages? Brian Barry has suggested that consociation works better for religious and class cleavages than it does for ethnic cleavages because "religious and class conflict is a conflict of organizations. Ethnic conflict is a conflict of solidary groups [that] do not need organization to work up a riot or pogrom as long as they have some way of recognising who belongs to which group."[60] Ethnic divisions are, he thinks, deeper and less amenable to organizational control, which makes it more difficult for leaders to restrain their followers. The stakes in ethnic conflicts are less negotiable, evidenced in outbidding by hardline elites and by massacres. Ethnic divisions raise the question of whether a state should be a state, as opposed to how it should be run. Barry's argument makes sense in two respects. Inter-ethnic divisions that have become inter-national divisions are less amenable to consociational engineering, or to consociational engineering alone. And pure class conflict is rarely as intense or as violent as pure ethnic conflict.

The rest of Barry's implicit political sociology of cleavages is less obvious than he thinks. Not all ethnic divisions generate rival nationalities, though they are more likely to do so than other divisions. If ethnic communities agree on the territorial integrity of a state or region, then creating and managing consociation need not be insuperably difficult, as it is not, for example, in Belgium and Switzerland. Proselytizing religious communities may be more mutually existentially threatening to collective and individual identity than endogamous

ethnic communities. Institutional compromises over the management of linguistic policies may be easier to obtain than over religious matters.[61] After all, linguistic groups need not listen to or read others' religious proclamations. And agreeing on programs of government may be easier between representative ethnic parties, or within a descriptively consociational catch-all party, than between parties divided by ideology or class.

In fact, it is rare for any complex state or region not to have multiple cross-cutting cleavages. Standard pluralist theory has it that cross-cutting cleavages dampen down the intensity of each cleavage – for example, ethnic divisions will dilute class divisions and vice versa – and multiply the bases on which people can be mobilized for coalitions. It suggests that, in this political environment of multiple and less-aligned group members, there will be less need for consociational politics. That is true when it is true, and it is also possible that a sustained period of consociational institutions may generate such a configuration. But its empirical likelihood appears to depend on the supposition that all cleavages are equally salient for significant numbers of cross-cut individuals.

There appear to be many cases, however, where cross-cutting cleavages do not reduce the intensity of a dominant antagonistic cleavage. Class divisions may lead to party differentiation within national, ethnic, or religious communities without reducing the intensity of the conflict between them. Indeed, where communities have been mobilized behind rival nationalisms or rival sectarianisms, this is almost true by definition. In these circumstances, standard pluralist or integrationist recipes are unlikely to work, and consociational prescriptions may be appropriate, even if they may not be easy to achieve.

However, consociationalists can accept pluralist reasoning up to a point. In the absence of a control system and where there are two national, ethnic, or religious communities, and where one is disproportionately concentrated in the dominant economic and subordinated economic strata respectively, we can legitimately expect conflict to be more likely, and more violent. This is why Lijphart has argued that approximate socio-economic equality between segments is a significant conducive factor in making and sustaining a consociational settlement – presumably because the political system will not be loaded with major redistributive conflicts between communities.

This does not mean that the futility thesis is correct, that consociationalism only works in societies that are mildly divided. That moderate

conflict makes consociation easier can hardly be denied. That it is the product of resolved struggles is scarcely a criticism: it is, or can be, a part of a resolution. Does the formation or existence of consociation prove that the cleavages in question were moderate in nature? Northern Ireland, Lebanon, and South Africa might suggest otherwise. Perhaps the cleavages were moderating, as a result of mutual recognition of a stalemate, but that is another matter. Consociation, it bears emphasis, is not peddled as a panacea – at least not by its careful exponents. And the suggested inapplicability or "inaptness" of consociational arrangements where deeply redistributive as well as profoundly symbolic and existential identity questions are at stake is just not proven – consider Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Northern Ireland. And even if it were proven, consociationalists would at least be able to advocate appropriate constitutional and political designs for moderate conflicts.

(b) The Domestic Political Regime: Political Culture and Institutions

Publics that are disposed towards accommodation and power sharing will reward political leaders and parties that promote these objectives. But this point simply echoes Daalder's argument about the importance of prior traditions of accommodation. What about the more problematic cases of ethnic communities that are not disposed by history or culture – or the present facts of their relations – to be well disposed towards consociational settlements and their maintenance? Here, the contribution of Eric Nordlinger remains helpful, though it needs restatement. According to Nordlinger, "the presence of conflict-regulating motives, in combination with conciliatory attitudes and the top leaders' political security, constitutes a sufficient explanation for elite conflict-regulating behaviour [and] the structured predominance of elites vis à vis non-elites within their own conflict groups is a necessary condition for conflict-regulating outcomes."[62] In Nordlinger's view, one or more of four conflict-regulating motives is necessary: the desire to ward off external states (on which see below); the desire to acquire or obtain governmental offices and power;[63] the desire to avoid bloodshed (Lijphart's self-denying prophecy); and the desire to obtain or increase prosperity (which is most likely when each community has an extensive commercial class). The first, third, and fourth of these are instrumental and statesmanlike considerations that would generate and maintain a consociation. Nordlinger's second point, however, is more controversial,

for it implies the necessity of secure and autonomous elite predominance over a politically deferential or organizationally encapsulated following.[64] Plainly, where publics are neither deferential nor encapsulated, sufficient numbers may nevertheless support a consociational regime – though, of course, the regime will be more vulnerable to the withdrawal of their electoral support and to the mobilizing appeals of undeferential and extremist ethnic or communal "outflankers."

It therefore seems better to argue that structured elite predominance facilitates the making of a settlement, rather than being a necessary condition. Nordlinger identifies four conditions that generate such predominance: (1) general apolitical quiescence; (2) politically acquiescent followers; (3) patron-client relations; and (4) mass parties with extensive organizational capabilities. The first three of these seem less and less likely to be available because of worldwide modernization processes – even if they are differential in their impact, and even if patron-client politics will persist in the developing world in the future. It is, therefore, organized mass parties with confident and secure leaders that are typically the politically critical variable.

This reasoning in turn generates a key institutional-design question. What systems of electoral and party law create the right environment for such parties to be able to generate consociations? Where consociational parties – i.e., single parties that are consociational in their internal make-up and policy positions – already exist, it is best to leave the electoral and party laws alone even if they are not based on pure PR. Lijphart, however, has been a consistent advocate of party-list PR to facilitate appropriately consociationally disposed parties and leaderships – suggesting that such systems give leaders control over their parties' candidates (and therefore over their internal party rivals), as well as obtaining transparent proportionality. But such systems, unless accompanied by high thresholds, also create incentives for dissidents to create their own parties and thereby encourage outflanking and possible system breakdown. Intra-ethnic competition may be as dangerous to a consociation as inter-ethnic competition if hardline extremists become ascendant within one or more communities. Preferential PR systems, such as the single transferable vote, however, may well assist moderate parties (as opposed to hardline parties) within ethnic communities. That is because moderate parties and their candidates are more likely to obtain lower-order voting preferences (transfers) from the voters of their ethnic rivals.[65]

Complete (as opposed to weak) consociations seem much less likely under party-list PR systems. Moreover, party-list PR alone cannot guarantee a power-sharing executive: for that to happen there have to be either norms or rules attached to executive formation. Other formulas may be more likely to discourage the creation of significant anti-system, ethnically exclusive, parties without breaking democratic or consociational norms. If the *de facto* and *de jure* thresholds in the electoral system and in access to the executive both require parties to be of a generally large size and willing to abide by the rules of the game, then the incentives for party fragmentation may be reduced. It may be possible to have laws on party registration and formation that temporarily protect existing parties – for example, laws that prevent parties from forming within parliament or prevent legislators from changing their party allegiances without resigning their offices – without institutionalizing a cartel. Systems in which voters directly choose the executive through preferential PR systems, and in which the legislature's rules require a well-formed executive to enjoy at least weak consociational support, may be worth considering. Then voters would in effect be faced with a choice: vote for a representative executive that will work or vote for executive chaos.[66]

(c) The External and International Environment

Three factors have been identified in the literature on the relations between a political system's external relations and its likelihood of adopting and maintaining consociational practices: size, shared threats, and foreign policy loads. I will add a fourth that has not previously been addressed: international norms.

Small demographic size is regularly invoked as a variable facilitating consociation.[67] This idea is inductively generated through observing the small populations of Lebanon, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles (and some would now add Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, South Tyrol – and, perhaps in the future, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia). Lijphart distinguishes four possible effects of small size. The direct internal effect is that political elites all know one another, interact regularly, and thereby negotiate more easily without too much constituency pressure. The direct external effect is that small states are likely to feel externally threatened and be more induced towards internal

accommodation. The indirect internal effect is that smaller states are easier to govern. The indirect external effect is that the country's low international salience creates a lighter foreign policy load.[68]

The hypothesized internal effects are less warranted than they appear. What matters, presumably, for successful elite interaction is psychological and political closeness rather than geographical distance. "Great hatreds, little room" was Yeats's memorable line about intra-Irish ethno-religious relations. Lijphart himself, drawing on Cyprus,[69] speculates that there may be directly negative effects from too small a population, as it makes a dearth of political talent more likely. But this, too, seems unwarranted; political talent has existed in abundance in Cyprus and Northern Ireland: it has just not been deployed until recently in a sustained politics of accommodation. The hypothesis of the greater governability of the small is surely not obvious: governing Lebanon is surely more daunting than governing France.

The external effects seem better warranted, but even here there are plausible counter-hypotheses. The direct external effect surely operates independently of size. That is because shared external threats give domestic elites significant incentives to accommodate one another's communities whatever the state's population happens to be (if size matters here it is because the smaller unit is geopolitically weaker). The direct effect, as Lijphart recognizes, surely also requires the threats to be shared – since only in that way can the belief that "my internal rival is my external enemy's enemy" generate the appropriate dispositions for coalition. The formation of the Lebanese *pacte nationale* in 1943 is a case in point. It was formed largely by Maronite and Sunni elites in opposition to the (Free) French mandatory authorities' coercive attempt to avoid decolonization. Analogous effects operated in 1958 when a political crisis re-equilibrated the Lebanese consociation as key elites sought to avoid external penetration of their state. The disappearance of sufficient shared threats, and the partisan alignment of local communities with external powers such as Israel, Syria, and Iran, was both cause and consequence of the breakdown of the Lebanese settlement in 1975. Agreement to weaken both Israeli and Syrian influence in the country arguably lay behind the making of the Ta'if Accord. As for the indirect external effect, it might be suggested that small states may well experience foreign policy overload, and, conversely, that a light foreign policy load might make the domestic indulgence of political antagonism easier. Within regional units of government, as opposed

to sovereign states, local elites have blocked power-sharing deals even though they have no serious international responsibilities – for example, the Ulster Unionists in Northern Ireland between 1974 and 1998.

No consociational theorist maintains that a small population size is a necessary condition of consociational success. Consociational transitional arrangements worked in South Africa between 1993 and 1996, despite a population of nearly 40 million. India, which is now probably the state with the world's largest population, and Canada, which has a population of over 30 million, have both been seen as having had at least semi-consociational pasts and possible futures. The EU, which encompasses over 450 million people, has consociational and confederal practices, especially in foreign and security policy.

Perhaps, therefore, there are better ways to express the intuition behind the apparent correlation between consociation and small-sized polities. One is that the elites of great powers, as opposed to small powers, are more likely to be reluctant to embrace consociational decision making because of security imperatives that arguably call for less consensual decision making and more energetic discretionary executive power. This reasoning lies behind the arguments of those who want to create a vigorous and energetic apparatus for the foreign and security policy making of the EU. The second is that great and regional powers may be more willing to impose domestic arrangements on small powers that they would not dream of imposing on themselves. The United States and European powers used vigorous coercion and inducements to promote consociational settlements in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. In the last century, the European powers intervened to create autonomy and rights packages for Christian minorities within many of the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire – packages that they did not always or even generally apply to their own religious minorities. Similarly, the centres of sovereign unitary states may be willing to induce local elites to agree to consociational autonomy or federal settlements in small, localized regions without re-engineering their core states, for example, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Italy and South Tyrol.

There is a last way in which external relations may matter in the genesis of consociations, and that is through the direct and indirect effects of international norms. There are, of course, diverse readings of the history of international norms and actions. The received understanding of the Westphalian system[7c] was that sovereign states were to leave

one another alone in their domestic cultural zones. In other words, their sovereignty gave them the right coercively to assimilate or integrate minorities within their borders. On some interpretations, sovereignty even included the right to commit genocide. This reading of the Westphalian system and its practices, however, has never been entirely without challengers. The Treaty of Westphalia protected some religious power sharing. Moreover, in the 1920s, after the collapse of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Czarist empires, some new European states that had been recognized at Versailles signed minority-rights treaties that in principle could have been regulated by the League of Nations. These treaties bound them not to abuse their minorities and in some cases required them to maintain or develop semi-consociational practices (notably in religious, educational, and linguistic matters). The result, of course, was hardly a success story – and indeed the United Nations was partly constructed in a deliberate rejection of these experiments. But the post-decolonization international law of self-determination, and the politics of recognition that arose in post-communist successor states, have prompted a revival of efforts to lock new states into systems of minority protection – and in turn this has provided some external shield for minorities that advance consociational demands.

Other indirect effects of international norms and interventions are apparent. There are international proscriptions against genocide and expulsion. There are norms of some significance that reward states that are democratic and that make non-democratic regimes potential pariahs. There are additional proscriptions against coercive assimilation. There remain strong biases in the state system against secession and partition. The conjunction of these norms leaves international organizations and great powers – when they intervene in national, ethnic, and communal conflicts – usually confined to promoting one of three repertoires of conflict regulation: (1) territorial autonomy and/or federation; (2) integration; or (3) consociation. In some scenarios, to prescribe integration – for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, or Cyprus – is to prescribe the partisan victory of one community over another. The upshot is that the normative prohibition, if not factual exclusion, of certain options that were once standard may create leverage in favour of consociational arrangements in small political systems.

There are at least three current experiments in what are termed "complex consociations" – Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

Macedonia – that illustrate the above tentative suggestions. All involve the four consociational institutions of executive power sharing, proportionality, autonomy, and veto rights; but they also involve international efforts to resolve national self-determination disputes; international involvement in the mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and implementation of peace settlements; and cross-border or confederal relationships (and sometimes institutions) for national minorities with their kin in other states. They are somewhat less frequent than the international promotion of autonomy settlements, but their presence in our times is suggestive.

Four elements make these emergent cases "complex." First, they are political settlements that specifically attempt to address national self-determination disputes between communities – i.e., where there is an opposition between at least some secessionists and some unionists or federalists – by institutionally recognizing more than one people, nation, or society and providing constitutional architecture within which more than one people can co-exist, durably if not necessarily permanently. The settlements may involve defining the state as multinational, recognizing national minorities as well as majorities, organizing referendums to ratify such settlements in more than one jurisdiction, or providing mechanisms to trigger referendums. Second, they are political settlements that simultaneously involve peace processes – mechanisms, confidence-building measures, and institutional and policy transformations that are intended to halt conflict and to terminate future violent recurrences.[71] They therefore involve the restructuring of security systems and the adoption of measures intended to end secessionist (and anti-secessionist) paramilitarism, as well as new human-rights protection mechanisms. Third, these settlements involve at least one other conflict-regulating strategy or principle in their design. This is most obvious in cases that combine consociation and territorial autonomy, as is illustrated by the attempted settlements in Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But this point requires further elaboration.

"Complex" consociations involve at least one additional strategy *other than consociation*. Excluding those strategies to which no minority community's leaders would freely give their assent – namely, genocide, expulsion, assimilation, and hegemonic control – in practice means that "complex" consociations involve the combination of consociational strategies with one or more other strategies such as territorial autonomy, arbitration, integration, and possibly "downsizing."

Consociations, for example, may be combined with territorial autonomy. Northern Ireland has territorial autonomy from Westminster. The

federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has territorial autonomy for Serbs, Bosniacs, and Croats. Macedonia will have territorial autonomy for Macedonian Albanians. Consociations may have arbitration mechanisms for resolving disputes between the partners, such as impartial courts, commissions, international judges, or international commissions. Consociations may have elements of integration, such as common citizenship equality laws and constitutional and institutional designs that permit the voluntary integration of communities. And, not least, they may have mechanisms that enable the secession of the relevant unit of consociational governance, or, alternatively, a procedure for enabling the central state to "downsize." Northern Ireland illustrates this point, but, by contrast, there is no such provision in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia.

A fourth and last element of complexity is international involvement in the making, ratification, and maintenance of the relevant consociational or autonomy settlements. This may involve neighbouring states, regional powers, great powers, the UN, or regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the EU. International involvement may be critical in organizing and monitoring ceasefires, in providing good offices for the making of settlements, in designing implementation arrangements, and in providing default mechanisms to arbitrate disputes. The levels of institutionalization may vary. Domestic incorporation of international human and minority rights standards does not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state. Institutionalized cross-border cooperation and the formation of bodies with executive powers in more than one formally sovereign jurisdiction, by contrast, do entail at least a pooling – if not necessarily a diminution – of sovereignty. High commissioners appointed by great powers are indistinguishable from the prefects of protectorates. In summary, "complex consociation" is distinguished by the existence of policies, institutions, and constitutional arrangements that address an antagonistic self-determination dispute, incorporate peace processes, involve elements of at least one other major domestic conflict-regulating strategy, and, lastly, enlist external or international powers in the making, implementation, and maintenance of the settlement.

The claim here is that these relatively novel emergent configurations are likely to proliferate in future crisis zones. That is not to suggest that they lack precedents; for example, the Cypriot constitution of 1960 had many of the elements of a complex consociation. It is to suggest that there are reasons why these hybrids are emerging simultaneously and

in a more widespread manner. The small-polity effect and changes in the norms of the international order may be the keys to such formations.

CONCLUSION

The rival moral and political evaluations of consociation are unlikely to be resolved and are probably not amenable to decisive confirmation or falsification by evidence. Anti-consociationalists fear that consociation will bring back racism, fundamentalism, and patriarchy, whereas consociationalists fear that integrationists will provoke avoidable wars and are biased in favour of dominant communities.[72] The intensity with which this debate has raged attests to the influence of consociational thought. It certainly belies the claim that consociationalism is irrelevant.

The test of concepts, taxonomies, and theories in the social and legal sciences is twofold, i.e., whether they serve worthwhile explanatory or normative purposes. The claim of this study is that the exponents of consociation, when their case is put carefully, can successfully rebut the wilder charges made against their moral and political positions. Consociations, simple or complex, are certainly difficult to love and celebrate – even if their makers often fully merit intellectual, moral, and political admiration. They are, after all, usually cold bargains, even if they may be tempered by political imagination. Ardent secessionists and uncompromising unionists might profitably be counselled that their efforts may land them with these systems if they fail to win on the battlefield.

As for the explanation of consociations, it is fair to say that, while significant preliminary work has been done, a comprehensive comparative historical analysis of consociational settlements and their outcomes remains to be completed. It will be no bad thing if further consociational research and practice reduces, by no matter what small amount, the tides of national, ethnic, religious, and communal blood that regrettably seem certain to flow in our times.

NOTES

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Ontario, London, Ontario, in November 2002, and in a revised form at the Cultural Diversity in a Globalizing World conference in Hawaii in February 2003. The chapter consists of segments of a work in progress. Appreciation is owed to John McGarry, Arend Lijphart, Katharine Adeney, John H. Aldrich, Tozun Bahcheli, Florian Bieber, Matthijs Bogaards, Shelley Deane, Kristin Henrard, John A. Hall, Jim Hughes, Margaret Moore, Jack H. Nagel, Sid Noel, Jurg Steiner, Gwen Sasse, Steve Wilkinson, and Stefan Wolff, and all my colleagues at the Asch Center at the University of Pennsylvania. These arguments were compelled into existence by the conviction that it is important to rebut now conventional criticisms of consociational theory and practice, for which some of my own friends and teachers are responsible, e.g., Brian Barry, Ian S. Lustick, Donald L. Horowitz, and Rupert Taylor. Changing their minds is part of the chapter's agenda.

2 Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1968); Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21, no.2 (1969): 207–25; Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1977); Arend Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985).

3 "Power sharing" is not a synonym for consociation because there are other than consociational ways to share power: e.g., through federation, intermittent and temporary coalitions, alternating governments, the separation of powers, and generally "collegial" institutions. See Randall Collins, *Democratization from the Outside in: A Geopolitical Theory of Collegial Power* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 1999). Each of the types of power sharing listed above can be deployed in consociational formats. What makes consociational power sharing distinctive is that it mandates power sharing across communities through formulae of proportionality and autonomy.

4 For further discussion, see John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press 2004).

5 Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985), 256.

6 Rupert Taylor, "The New South Africa: Consociational or Consensual Power-Sharing," *ASEN Bulletin* 8 (2004): 14–18; Rupert Taylor, "Consociation or Social Transformation?" in John McGarry, ed., *Northern Ireland and the Divided World: Post-agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press 2001), 36–52; Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland:*

Power, Conflict and Emancipation (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press 1996).

7 Paul R. Brass, *Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies: The Consociational Solution and Its Critics* (New Delhi: Sage 1991), 338.

8 Taylor, "Consociation or Social Transformation?," 40.

9 Brass, *Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies*, 346n.11.

10 For a typical libertarian-conservative statement of the jeopardy thesis, see Thomas Sowell, *Preferential Policies: An International Perspective* (New York: Quill 1990).

11 Brass, *Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies*, 334 (my emphasis).

12 Ibid., 334, 339.

13 Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, "South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order," *Politics & Society* 23, no.3 (1995): 273–4, 293; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 1991).

14 Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers," *European Journal of Political Research* 3 (1975): 393–413; Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 477–505.

15 M.P.C.M. Van Schendelen, "The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticism," *Acta Politica* 1 (1984): 19–55.

16 Brass, *Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies*, 340. Since Brass uses Great Britain for his argument rather than the United Kingdom, one must assume that his exclusion of Northern Ireland from his endorsement of its adversarial politics is deliberate (or else, like some Americans, he fallaciously equates Great Britain with the United Kingdom). If Northern Ireland is considered part of the United Kingdom political system, which it has been, the merits of adversarial politics are much less obvious. See Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, *The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland*, 2nd ed. (London: Athlone Press 1996). As for the United States, the claims for the integrative effects of adversarial politics with respect to native Americans and the descendants of slaves have been unconvincing to successive cohorts of foreign observers of the country from Tocqueville to Myrdal. Their stories are an integral part of the critical histories of American political development. See Rogers M. Smith, *Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1997).

17 Brass, *Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies*, 341.

18 Sue Halpern, "The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy," *West European Politics* 9, no.2 (1986): 181–97.

19 Ronald Kieve, "Pillars of Sand: A Marxist Critique of Consociational Democracy in the Netherlands," *Comparative Politics* 13, no.3 (1981): 313–37.

20 Ian S. Lustick, "Lijphart, Lakatos and Consociationalism," *World Politics* 50, no.3 (1997): 88–117.

21 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1991.

22 Arend Lijphart, "The Politics of Accommodation: Reflections – Fifteen Years Later," *Acta Politica* 19, no.1 (1984): 9–18; Lijphart, *Power-sharing in South Africa*, 83–117.

23 Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Oxford, U.K.: Polity Press 2000), 51–78.

24 John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government," in H.B. Acton, ed., *Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government* (London: J.M. Dent 1988). John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Other Writings* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press 1989). In *On Liberty* and *Considerations on Representative Government*, Mill, like Tocqueville, was much more concerned about the tyranny of the ignorant and of conformist puritanical, ignorant, and unlettered masses. In *Considerations*, however, he famously decreed the unlikelihood of multinational or bi-national states (391–8).

25 Otto Bauer, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy*, ed. Ephraim Nimni, trans. Joseph O'Donnell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2000).

26 Arend Lijphart, "The Evolution of Consociational Theory and Constitutional Practices, 1965–2000," *Acta Politica* 37 (2002): 11–22.

27 W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa,* the Whidden Lectures, (Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 1965).

28 For examples of this reasoning, see S.J.R. Noel, "Canadian Responses to Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism, Federalism and Control," in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, ed., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict-Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts* (London: Routledge 1993), 41–61; Milton Esman, "Power Sharing and the Constructionist Fallacy," in Markus Crepaz, Thomas A. Kolbe, and David Wilsford, ed., *Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2000), 91–113.

29 Michael Walzer, *On Toleration* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1997), 22.

30 Halpern, "Disorderly Universe," 190.

31 These distinctions may be clarified by placing them on the Nagel spectrum. See Jack H. Nagel, "Expanding the Spectrum of Democracies: Reflections on Proportional Representation in New Zealand," in Crepaz et al., *Democracy and Institutions*, 113–27.

32 Lijphart recognizes this, describing "joint decision making" as the key characteristic of power sharing. See Arend Lijphart, "Multiethnic Democracy," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* (London: Routledge 1995) 853–65. My analysis suggests that some objections to Lijphart's classifications may be dismissed: for example, Horowitz's objection that none of the four developing countries identified by Lijphart as having followed consociational practices – namely, Lebanon, Malaysia, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles – had grand coalitions because each group was represented by more than one set of leaders. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 575.

33 Donald L. Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?" in Ian Shapiro and Stephen Macedo , ed., *Designing Democratic Institutions* (New York: New York University Press 2000), 253–84; Jung and Shapiro, *South Africa's Negotiated Transition*, 269–308.

34 Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 130–4.

35 The offer of such institutions, it is important to add, came intermittently from the U.K. government; but even if nationalists had not had a wider agenda, not even a plurality of Ulster Unionists was then prepared to share executive power with them.

36 Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven, Conn., and London: Yale University Press 1989), 273–5; Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-seven Democracies* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press 1994), 25–30.

37 Brendan O'Leary, "The Nature of the British-Irish Agreement," *New Left Review* 233 (1999): 66–96.

38 My thanks to Matthijs Bogaards for obliging me to address this matter (personal communication).

39 Where one segment stays constantly in the executive and alternates its partners from other segments, it may seem plausible to label such a phenomenon a "diachronic grand coalition," but this, I submit, looks too much like conceptual stretching.

40 Donald V. Smiley, "French-English Relations in Canada and Consociational Democracy," in Milton Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1977). S.J.R. Noel cites historian Frank Underhill as saying that the great Canadian invention of the nineteenth century was the "composite bi-racial, bi-cultural party, uniting both French and English voters" (Noel, "Canadian Responses to Ethnic Conflict," 49).

41 I have benefited from discussions with Matthijs Bogaards. Our positions are not, in my view, very different.

42 The second and third criteria are Bogaards's; the first and last are mine.

43 O'Leary, *Consociation*.

44 Arend Lijphart, "Foreword: One Basic Problem, Many Theoretical Options – And a Practical Solution?" in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, ed., *The Future of Northern Ireland* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press 1990), vi–viii.

45 See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press 1995); Will Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press Canada 1998); Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ed., *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000).

46 Adriano Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique," *European Journal of Political Research* 9 (1981): 365–90; Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University 1972).

47 Two of Lijphart's critics, Lustick and Bogaards, observe the changes in the numbers of conducive conditions he identifies over successive publications. Lustick makes fun of the changes, but, rather than seeing them as indicative of inconsistency on Lijphart's part, they should be viewed as an appropriately flexible and explicit effort to refine theory through accepting logical and empirical criticism.

48 Arend Lijphart, "The Power-sharing Approach," in Joseph P. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books 1989), 497–8.

49 Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 55.

50 Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 55.

51 For a lucid exposition of the Nash equilibrium, see Ken G. Binmore, *Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath 1992), xxix, 602.

52 Pappalardo, "Conditions," 369.

53 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, before the war that accompanied its independence, the demographic composition of the population (in 1981) was 40 per cent Bosniac (of Muslim origin), 32 per cent Serb, and 18 per cent Croat (with the remaining 10 per cent identified as "Yugoslavs" or as members of other ethnic groups or of mixed origins) – S.P. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–91*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1992), 181 (calculated from Table 22). A combination of Bosniacs and Serbs or Bosniacs and Croats would thus constitute a clear majority, while a Croat-Serb coalition was within credible reach of a majority. This tripolar situation, in which no one segment had a demographic or electoral majority, but in which any combination of two could credibly hope to have one, became explosive. For accounts of the civil and international war that followed and its aftermath, see Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House 1998); and Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (New York: Oxford University Press 2002).

54 Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of Netherlands and Switzerland," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 3, no.2 (1971): 11–25. Sceptics suggest that this idea may simply displace the key question: the continuation of elite accommodation in open democratic conditions may deserve explanation as much as its origins. See Rudy Andeweg, "Consociational Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no.1 (2000): 509–36.

55 Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System," *European Journal of Political Research* 3 (1975): 377–91.

56 Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation*, 42–53.

57 McGarry and O'Leary, *Understanding Northern Ireland*.

58 Lijphart, "Evolution of Consociational Theory," 20n3.

59 See McGarry and O'Leary, *Understanding Northern Ireland*; McGarry and O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict*. That is one of our arguments concerning Northern Ireland.

60 Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation," 502–3. Horowitz makes a similar claim: "European [as opposed to Asian or African] conflicts are less ascriptive in character, less severe in intensity, less exclusive in their command of the loyalty of participants, and less pre-emptive of other forms of conflict" (*Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 571–2).

61 David Laitin, *Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press 1992).

62 Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation*, 119.

63 Horowitz's claim that "no mechanism can be adduced for the adoption or retention of consociational institutions, particularly no reason grounded in electoral politics" ("Constitutional Design," 258) is unwarranted. Politicians may have both instrumental incentives and other reasons to make and maintain consociational institutions. Horowitz's claim startlingly contradicts the claim of other consociational critics (and that he has also made) that the making and preservation of consociations provides incentives for politicians to maintain and reinforce group differences and bestow patronage based on quotas.

64 Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation*, 78–87; see also Pappalardo, "Conditions," 380–2.

65 Paul Mitchell, Brendan O'Leary, and Geoffrey Evans, "The 2001 Elections in Northern Ireland: Moderating 'Extremists' and the Squeezing of the Moderates," *Representation* 39, no.1 (2002): 23–36; Paul Mitchell, "Transcending an Ethnic Party System? The Impact of Consociational Governance on Electoral Dynamics and the Party System," in Rick Wilford, ed., *Aspects of the Belfast Agreement* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press (2001), 28–48.

66 Within regional consociations or protectorates, the relevant publics may enjoy the luxury of irresponsibility: they may be able to vote for chaos knowing that direct rule from the centre or international rulers will likely take over from the local executives. Voters in independent and sovereign consociations have greater reasons to be circumspect.

67 Lijphart, *Plural Societies*, 65–70.

68 Lijphart, *Politics of Accommodation*, 59ff., 122ff.

69 Lijphart, *Plural Societies*, 139; Lijphart, *Power-sharing in South Africa*, 123.

70 The system of state sovereignty that developed in Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).

71 John Darby and Roger MacGinty, ed., *The Management of Peace Processes* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave 2000).

72 McGarry and O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict*, chapter 1.

For Arend Lijphart